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growth is weak, labor force participation 
is historically low, and deep concerns 
remain, particularly about the low-wage 
workforce. Temporary help agencies, 
which hire a disproportionate share of 
low-wage workers, are often touted 
as providing a pathway to permanent, 
better jobs for these workers, yet we see 
strikingly low hire rates in our data, even 
among those in temp-to-hire contracts. 
Low conversion rates to permanent jobs 
with clients refl ect the fact that employers 
are highly selective in making job offers 
to temporary help workers, but they also 
refl ect skills defi cits among the workers. 
Performance problems or quits prior to 
assignment completion drive a signifi cant 
share of temporary help assignment 
terminations, with “soft skill” problems 
such as tardiness and unexcused absences 
notably high among the lower-paid 
temporary workers. In sum, our data 
indicate that the pathway to better jobs 
via temporary help employment currently 
is limited for low-wage workers. 
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This article highlights fi ndings from “The Rise of 
Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the Ger-
man Wage Structure,” Upjohn Institute Working 
Paper No. 15-244. To read the paper, please visit 
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/244/. 
The last three decades have seen a 
thorough transformation of the nature 
of the labor market, with large fi rms 
increasingly relying on nontraditional 
employment arrangements such as 
outsourcing, temporary or contingent 
work, offshoring, and subcontracting. 
Across a wide range of industries, 
fi rms have been focusing on their 
“core competencies” and hiring outside 
companies to provide services that were 
once performed by their own employees, 
such as cleaning, security, logistics, human 
resources, or information technology. 
Outsourcing to business service 
providers potentially allows for reductions 
in wages for the contracted-out jobs. The 
outsourcing fi rms are often traditional 
lead companies in sectors such as 
manufacturing or fi nance, and they 
typically offer the most attractive jobs, 
with higher wages, increased job security, 
strong worker representation, and union 
coverage. Large employers may thus 
fi nd it benefi cial to reduce the number 
of direct employees who benefi t from 
such wage premia by outsourcing jobs to 
subcontractors. These business service 
fi rms compete fi ercely with each other for 
service contracts from large companies 
on price, and since labor costs are a large 
share of business service fi rms’ total costs, 
this creates intense pressure to lower 
wages and reduce benefi ts. 
We analyze domestic labor service 
outsourcing in Germany using detailed 
administrative data on workers and fi rms. 
We use the term domestic outsourcing 
rather than offshoring, as it refers to a 
form of outsourcing where the service 
provider is located in the same country. 
We document for the fi rst time in detail 
the increase in outsourced labor services 
over the last three decades in Germany, 
focusing in particular on cleaning, 
security, logistics, and food services. 
Figure 1 shows the share of all full-
time workers in business service fi rms 
that provide cleaning, security, and 
logistics services, as well as temporary 
help agencies. In 1975 only 2 percent 
of the German labor force worked for 
such companies, but that number almost 
quadrupled by 2008 to around 7 percent. 
A substantial share of this rise is due to 
the growth in both temp agency work and 
business service fi rms. Since employment 
in cleaning, security, and logistics 
occupations has remained relatively 
constant, this suggests that a much larger 
share of these occupations are now 
working for contractors. 
In order to obtain credible effects of 
outsourcing on wages, we develop a new 
method of identifying a particular type 
of outsourcing—on-site outsourcing—
which refers to situations where a large 
employer spins out a group of workers 
providing a particular service, such as 
cafeteria workers, to a legally separate 
business unit, such as a subsidiary or an 
existing business service provider. In these 
situations the outsourced workers still 
work together and do essentially the same 
job at the same physical location but for 
a different employer. Such outsourcing 
events can be identifi ed in administrative 
data sets using worker fl ows between 
establishments. 
The basic intuition is that if a group 
of workers is contracted out at the same 
time, this can be observed by following 
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the establishment identifi ers as well 
as occupation and industry codes. For 
example, if a group of workers splits off 
from a large bank in year t − 1 and forms a 
new establishment identifi er in year t with 
an industry code of “cafeteria,” this likely 
indicates that the bank is outsourcing its 
cafeteria staff. We compare workers who 
are outsourced in these on-site outsourcing 
events to workers in the same occupation 
and industry who are not outsourced and 
estimate how their wages change over 
time. 
Figure 2 shows the main estimates 
of outsourcing’s effect on wages. While 
wages of both groups of workers move 
in parallel up to the year of outsourcing 
(year 0 in the fi gure), they drop for the 
outsourced workers as soon as outsourcing 
occurs by about 2.5 percent. The wage 
differential then keeps growing until it 
reaches about 10 percent, approximately 
5–10 years after outsourcing. This 
suggests large and long-lasting wage 
differentials between outsourced and 
in-house jobs. Since these differences 
also imply that outsourcing may lead to 
substantial cost savings to employers, we 
investigate whether fi rms that pay higher 
wages relative to the market have a higher 
likelihood of outsourcing any of their 
labor services, and we do indeed fi nd that 
fi rms are signifi cantly more likely to do 
so the more they pay above market-level 
wages.
Finally, we consider the relationship 
between the documented impacts of 
outsourcing in Germany and the broad 
changes in the country’s wage structure 
over the last three decades. Dustmann et 
al. (2014) document a dramatic decline of 
real wages at the lower end of the wage 
distribution since the early 2000s. After a 
decade of stagnation from 1990 to 2000, 
real wages at the 15th percentile fell by 
around 10 percent between 2000 and 
2008.
 Furthermore, Card, Heining, and 
Kline (2013) observe that low-skill 
workers are increasingly working 
at low-paying establishments and 
are increasingly concentrated in 
establishments with homogenous 
workforces where most workers have 
similar occupations. Outsourcing provides 
a natural explanation for this, since it 
typically involves outsourcing low-skill 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
NOTE: The blue lines represent 95 percent confi dence intervals. The fi gure shows the evolution of 
wages for outsourced workers in food, cleaning, security, and logistics occupations relative to the 
wages of workers in the same occupations and industries who are not outsourced. Year 0 is the 
fi rst year of outsourcing. The y-axis is measured in fraction of relative wage losses to obtain the 
wage loss in percent multiply by 100.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 1  Fraction of Full-Time Workers in Germany in Cleaning, Security, or 
Logistics Business Service Firms or Temp Agencies, by Year
Figure 2  The Effect of Outsourcing on Log Wages of Outsourced Workers in Germany 
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workers to very competitive low-paying 
establishments. In addition, outsourcing 
provides a natural explanation for the 
increase in occupational sorting: since 
business service fi rms are much more 
homogenous (for example, in the typical 
cleaning fi rm, about 60 percent of the 
employees are cleaners), moving workers 
from heterogeneous lead employers to 
business service fi rms that employ largely 
the same occupations as the outsourced 
worker will increase the overall 
occupational assortativeness. 
 We quantify the contribution of 
outsourcing to the rise in wage inequality 
in Germany using a reweighting 
method, which allows us to calculate 
a counterfactual distribution of wages 
in Germany under the scenario that 
outsourcing did not increase since the 
1980s. Figure 3 shows the evolution 
of different percentiles of the wage 
distribution relative to 1985. Especially 
for low wages, outsourcing contributed 
substantially to the increase in inequality. 
Overall we show that about 9 percent of 
the increase in inequality can be accounted 
for by the increase in outsourcing of 
just these four occupations. Since many 
other tasks experienced an increase in 
outsourcing, this should be viewed as a 
lower bound with the overall contribution 
of all forms of outsourcing to wage 
inequality possibly being much larger. 
The labor market has seen a fundamental 
restructuring in recent decades, with lead 
employers increasingly contracting out 
parts of their noncore labor force. 
This reorganization of the production 
structure changes the employment 
relationship for a large share of the 
workforce. As more workers become 
employed by specialized business service 
fi rms, they fi nd themselves working for 
companies that provide narrow products 
and compete fi ercely with similar fi rms 
for contracts with lead companies. This 
creates pressure to reduce costs and lower 
wages, which likely makes up a large 
share of input costs among these types of 
business service providers. 
This restructuring also drastically 
changes the bargaining environment, as 
the price competition among business 
service fi rms makes it diffi cult for 
outsourced workers to bargain for a share 
of the fi rm rents at the lead company. In 
this article, we provide careful estimates 
of how this translates into lower wages 
for outsourced workers, and we fi nd 
that across a wide range of measures, 
outsourcing reduces wages by around 
10 percent. Our method implies that this 
is not due to selection of different types 
of workers in outsourced employment 
relationships or to differences in the 
types of jobs that outsourced workers 
do. Instead, it appears that outsourced 
workers receive lower pay because they 
are excluded from fi rm rents that are being 
paid to workers at the lead companies.
It is diffi cult to know why fi rms decide 
to outsource parts of their workforces, 
but our evidence indicates that fi rms that 
pay wage premia to their workers are 
more likely to outsource. This suggests 
that saving on labor costs is part of the 
motivation, but other reasons include 
comparative advantage of business service 
fi rms in their specialty, cost savings 
through economies of scale, and gains in 
effi ciency through market pressures in 
the competitive environment of bidding 
for service contracts. It is even more 
diffi cult to know what is driving the long-
term increase in outsourcing. Changes 
in management philosophy (e.g., a move 
toward emphasis on shareholder value in 
the 1980s and 1990s) may be of similar 
importance as the development of new 
technologies makes it easier to rely on 
contractors. Understanding this is beyond 
the scope of this project but a fruitful area 
for future research. 
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Figure 3  The Contribution of Oursourcing of Cleaning, Security, and Logistics 
Occupations to the Rise in Wage Inequality in Germany
